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This article provides a different angle to understand the Cambridge Analytica (CA) data scandal. It focuses 
on the role of models and simulations in the big data campaigning tools CA allegedly used, and their 
epistemological and ontological potential to produce and reproduce voters’ digital doubles that would first 
colonise and eventually replace the analogue selves they were related to. By integrating and revising 
Zuboff’s surveillance capitalism framework with Debord’s classic theory of the Spectacle, the article argues 
that the dystopian simulations played as real life experiments by surveillance capitalist firms such as CA 
have the ultimate goal of replacing analogue humanity with digital humanity – the two kinds are 
ontologically different albeit dialectically related. The predictive models that these simulations produce are 
only as good as the capacity of the digital doubles in the simulations to shape the behaviour of analogue 
selves in line with the simulations’ parameters and goals. 
KEYWORDS: 
Capitalism; digital democracy; digitalisation; simulation; spectacle; subjectivity; surveillance. 
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: 





Work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non commercial-










Since the online political campaign firm Cambridge Analytica (CA from now onwards) data scandal hit the 
spotlight in 2018, there has been a growing academic interest in various aspects and dimensions of the scandal, 
from the privacy implications for social media users (e.g. Hinds et al., 2020) to broader questions about the 
integrity of elections and of the democratic process (e.g. Heawood, 2018; Ward, 2018). Admittedly the peer-
reviewed academic literature is still relatively small, compared for instance to the large number of media 
commentary and nonfiction books (some of them published by academics themselves). But the fast growing 
amount of academic literature on online political campaigning (e.g. Hoferer et al., 2020; Roemmele and 
Gibson, 2020) and the role of big data (e.g. Baldwin-Philippi, 2019; Witzleb et al., 2020) and algorithms (e.g. 
Ndlela, 2020; Papakyriakopoulos et al., 2018) in influencing political behaviour, gives an idea of the broader 
interest from various branches of the social sciences around some of the key issues that emerged from the CA 
data scandal. 
A UK-based company, CA rose to prominence when it was hired by Donald Trump for his 2016 US 
presidential campaign a few months before the 2016 November election (Lapowski, 2017). What brought it 
notoriety in 2018 was allegations that the company had acquired vast amounts of personal data on several 
dozens of millions of US voters (and voters from other nations to a lesser extent) through possibly illegal and 
certainly unethical ways (BBC, 2018; Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018). What came under scrutiny 
was the use by Cambridge Analytica and by its partners of the now notorious Facebook “Friends API” (API 
stands for Application Programming Interface) to collect data from millions of user profiles via a much smaller 
numbers of profiles that had actually consented to the collection – if you consented to your data being collected, 
the API would collect also the personal data of all your friends, without their consent or knowledge. The issue 
of personal data collected by tech firms and ethical procedures for their collection and use is one major thread 
that emerges in the academic literature on Cambridge Analytica (e.g. Isaak and Hanna, 2018; Richterich, 
2018). 
But what stimulated vibrant responses and a variety of opinions from scholars in popular publications 
(Kavanagh, 2018; Lynch et al., 2018; Sumpter, 2018), and increasingly in academic work (González, 2017; 
Laterza, 2018, 2021), was the assessment of the  initial claims by CA (later retracted) that the company could 
deliver an election by using online personality profiling to target voters with specifically crafted messages that 
would persuade them to vote for the client candidate (Sumpter, 2018: 43, 57). The broader question emerging 
in these debates is whether big data and online personality profiling could have been decisive factors in 
delivering Trump’s 2016 victory – and therefore whether they can be used to effectively persuade voters in 
elections more generally. 
Many of these accounts tend to be dismissive of this possibility, and they often do so by raising doubts that 
online personality profiling can hold such powers to sway voters’ behaviour (e.g. González, 2017; Sumpter, 
2018). In a previous article (Laterza, 2021) I criticised these accounts, arguing that a narrow focus on online 
personality profiling is not likely to provide a comprehensive picture of what CA actually did, and of the 
potential efficacy of its methods. CA activities, its methods and the social, political, economic and historical 
context within which CA operated, need to be studied holistically so that we can gain a broader understanding 
of what CA was doing (Laterza, 2021) and of its effectiveness in “public relations” campaigns with the explicit 
aim of “behavioural change” (read in this case: influencing voters’ behaviours to the client’s advantage). 
In that article (Laterza, 2021), I provide some of the building blocks needed for such holistic analysis, by 
focusing on the crucial role played by qualitative research and by human insight in making big data and 
algorithms effective. My main argument there is that humans and big data (and online personality profiling as 








Sumpter, 2018). Human insight informs the interpretation of the findings from big data and the decisions based 
on these findings. The alliance of human insight with the scaling power of big data, can indeed sway a 
significant number of voters (Laterza, 2021). In highly contested elections such as the 2016 US presidential 
contest, all one needs is to shift the voter behaviour of few dozens thousands people, rather than millions 
(Laterza, 2021) – hence even a modest improvement in prediction rates provided by big data and algorithms 
can have a decisive effect on the electorate and the final result. 
In this article, I focus on an aspect that, to my knowledge, has been so far neglected in both the academic 
and public debates around CA: the role of models and simulations of targeted US voters that CA allegedly 
built to support its big data campaigning, and some of the deeper epistemological and ontological questions 
spurred by the use of these tools. The approach developed in this work is inserted in the tradition of social 
theory and draws also from philosophical anthropology, philosophy of technology and other interdisciplinary 
discussions of digitalisation and its societal implications that are taking place at the intersections of in-depth 
qualitative social sciences and theoretical humanities. The aim is less to prove what CA did or did not do, and 
more to provide speculative theoretical reflections about these issues, so that as academics, practitioners and 
citizens we can engage with some of the key existential questions that the rapid digitalisation of politics and 
society are bringing to the fore. As a social theory article, this work focuses primarily on theorisation emerging 
from the in-depth reading of a select number of key theoretical texts, and does not offer an exhaustive review 
of the available literature. It should be noted that I do not claim to provide entirely original arguments 
disconnected from the philosophical discussions treated in depth here. The goal is to highlight key dimensions 
of these debates by focusing primarily on three works: CA whistleblower Christopher Wylie’s memoir of his 
involvement with Cambridge Analytica (2019), business studies scholar Shoshana Zuboff’s empirical and 
theoretical treatment of surveillance capitalism (2019), and philosopher and activist Guy Debord’s classic work 
The Society of the Spectacle (2005 [1967]). 
One issue with the available literature is that it takes for granted the kind of humans that CA was extracting 
data from and was microtargeting with specific political messages. In other words, most authors on the subject 
do not try to define or engage explicitly with questions such as how people might shape or be shaped by the 
technological tools they use, and assume for the most part that people are autonomous agents whose 
interactions with digital tools do not fundamentally change the basic structures of thinking and feeling that 
characterise their lives. 
This ignores the vast literature on the role of mediation in digital technology (Ihde, 1990; Kaptelinin and 
Nardi, 2006; Verbeek, 2005), which suggests that humans can indeed experience deep changes in their 
perceptions and ways of thinking and acting in the world as they interact with various digital tools and 
environments. Within the broader context of these works, I want to problematise the conception of the human 
in CA activities, as a way to discuss broader questions about humanity and its future under digital capitalism. 
I speculatively propose that the CA case illuminates a broader trend that characterises the current stage of 
digital capitalism: the digital conquest of what I refer to as “analogue humanity”, and the transformation of the 
latter into a different life form which I name “digital humanity”. The two kinds of humanity (analogue and 
digital) are distinct, but interact with each other, and the current process of digitalisation suggests that digital 
humanity might be rapidly replacing the analogue humanity it is connected to, unless radical changes in the 
social and economic structures of the world occur. 
By drawing from the book-length narrative of CA whistleblower Christopher Wylie (2019), I first ground 
my analysis in Wylie’s account of CA key actors’ ambition to “re-create society in silico” (Wylie, 2019: 79), 
a virtual simulation of an entire society (in this case the US) with a digital replica of each real life member of 
it. I will analyse some of the aspects of this vision through Wylie’s account, showing how this can provide an 








There are limitations in relying on a single source for this purpose. But I have been studying the CA case for 
some time now (Laterza 2018, 2021) and, to my knowledge, Wylie’s memoir is the only substantial account 
of CA that engages in depth with this vision. The fact that the idea of replicating society in a computer 
simulation is inserted – as I will refer to later – in a well established niche of applied social sciences and ICT 
studies makes Wylie’s account on this issue particularly interesting and relevant, and provides some grounding 
to explore the philosophical implications of this important issue.  
Wylie remains an important source given his role in bringing the CA case to public attention and the 
substantial amount of evidence he provided to various commissions of inquiry in the UK and the US. Given 
the public interest of the CA case, and the fact that it would be inevitably shrouded in secrecy and that we have 
to work with the available evidence, there is a serious case to be made to have these important academic 
discussions which would otherwise be off limits to scholars. It is precisely because of the importance of getting 
some insight, albeit partial and incomplete, into what might have been CA main actors’ vision, that this section 
relies extensively on quotes from Wylie, which I believe reveal the urgency of these discussions. 
I will then move on to discuss the epistemological and ontological implications of having models and 
simulations running artificial societies of the kind envisaged by Wylie. Here I will first contextualise CA 
activities as integral to what Shoshana Zuboff’s (2019) has labelled in her latest book “surveillance capitalism”. 
I will show that Zuboff’s magisterial work offers us a solid political economy analysis of the current stage of 
digital capitalism, but stops short of highlighting the most far-reaching ontological implications: that states 
and corporations are not just rendering human experience into data for profit and security purposes (Zuboff’s 
argument), but they might also be waging a radical programme of transforming what I call analogue humanity 
into digital humanity. My argument is that the “replicas” of ourselves in computer simulations – digital doubles 
such as those allegedly attempted by CA – are not in fact replicas, but autonomous forms of life with their own 
agency, interacting closely with our analogue selves and realities, and gradually swallowing our analogue lives 
up into a new form of life that might eventually colonise the whole world: I speculate that this might be the 
intention of Zuboff’s (2019) surveillance capitalists. At the time of writing, we are in the middle of a pandemic 
that has spurred one of the greatest acceleration of digitalisation since the advent of the personal computer, 
which makes a discussion of these issues particularly timely. Will rapid digitalisation further lead us on a path 
where our digital doubles become the dominant agents at the expense of our analogue selves? What will happen 
to our analogue lives when the Covid-19 pandemic emergency will be over? These questions form some 
important background to the discussions presented here. 
In order to grasp the autonomy of digital doubles from our analogue selves, and the political economy of 
representations and signs that these doubles are part of, I will draw primarily from Guy Debord’s (2005) theory 
of the Spectacle – here updated, with a term drawn from recent literature (Briziarelli and Armano 2017), as the 
Digital Spectacle. The Digital Spectacle fills the productive gaps and cracks of Zuboff’s (2019) political 
economy of the latest stage of digital capitalism. 
 
2. CA totalising vision of “society in silico” 
 
CA whistleblower Wylie’s (2019) account zooms in on many of the topics that had caught the attention of 
investigative journalists and US and UK parliamentary representatives involved in commissions of inquiry 
about the CA data scandal. It extensively discusses key aspects of the rationale, scientific foundation and 
methodology behind personality assessment from social media data, and how, in its early days, CA went about 








to develop algorithmic analysis of voter behaviours, and the segmentation of voters into groups according to 
their characteristics and in relation to their potential to change their voting behaviour.1 
According to Wylie (2019), there was a bigger vision than just swaying elections in the US and other parts 
of the world, behind what he and other data scientists were trying to achieve under the leadership of Alexander 
Nix (CA director, heading the business side), Steve Bannon (US far right propagandist with international 
ambitions, and former Trump aide in the White House), Robert Mercer (CA investor, technologist, right-wing 
billionaire and major donor to the US Republican Party) and Robert’s daughter Rebekah Mercer (director of 
the Mercer Family Foundation, and key figure representing the Mercers’ interests in American politics). 
According to Wylie, this vision, also shared by Bannon and Robert Mercer, was to build “the first prototype 
of the artificial society” (Wylie, 2019: 69). This they would do “[b]y profiling every citizen in a country, 
imputing their personalities and unique behaviors, and placing those profiles in an in silico simulation of that 
society (one created inside a computer)” (Wylie, 2019: 69). Wylie thought that Mercer was interested in this 
project as an extension of what he already did with his successful hedge fund Renaissance Technologies, which 
uses predictions from artificial intelligence models to invest in the stock market: 
 
Mercer had involved people from his company Renaissance Technologies in the original 
scoping of SCL [CA’s parent company], and, given that Nix was so focused on money and a 
hedge fund was part of the early stages of this project, everyone was under the impression 
that this was going to become a commercial venture. To put it crudely, if we could copy 
everyone’s data profiles and replicate society in a computer–like the game The Sims but with 
real people’s data–we could simulate and forecast what would happen in society and the 
market. This seemed to be Mercer’s goal. If we created this artificial society, we thought we 
would be on the threshold of creating one of the most powerful market intelligence tools in 
the world. We would be venturing into a new field–cultural finance and trend forecasting for 
hedge funds. (Wylie, 2019: 81-82) 
 
It then turned out that this was more than a commercial project. Mercer’s real goal, according to Wylie, was 
far more ambitious: 
 
Mercer, the computer engineer turned social engineer, wanted to re-factor society and 
optimize its people. One of his hobbies is building model train sets, and I got the feeling that 
he thought he could, in effect, get us to build him a model society for him to tinker with until 
it was perfect. By taking a leap at quantifying many of the intrinsic aspects of human behavior 
and cultural interaction, Mercer eventually realized that he could have at his disposal the 
Uber of information warfare. And, like Uber, which decimated the hundred-year-old taxi 
industry with a single app, his venture was about to do the same with democracy. (Wylie, 
2019: 82) 
 
Different interests and personalities seemed to be converging on the same goal. For Bannon, a far right 
propagandist with a “quasi-religious” (Wylie, 2019: 82) attitude and the belief that a cataclysmic event was 
 
1 Wylie’s account is well complemented by another book by whistleblower Brittany Kaiser (2019) – the latter focuses more on 
the business aspect of CA, while Wylie’s angle is that of a data scientist focusing on CA data tools. For an accessible in-depth 








about to hit the world in a dystopian process of restoring the lost order of the cosmos, a society in silico 
performed a different function: 
 
For Bannon, this was a full-on culture war. As a self-anointed prophet, Bannon wanted a tool 
to peer into the future of our societies. And with what Bannon called Facebook’s God’s-eye 
view of each and every citizen, he could work to find the [cosmic purpose] for every 
American. In this way our research became almost spiritual for him. (Wylie, 2019: 83) 
 
The academics involved at the time, including Wylie as an enthusiastic PhD student in fashion studies and 
other colleagues from the University of Cambridge and elsewhere, were also excited about this project: 
 
With access to enough Facebook data, it would finally be possible to take the first stab at 
simulating society in silico. The implications were astonishing: You could, in theory, 
simulate a future society to create problems like ethnic tension or wealth disparity and watch 
how they play out. You could then backtrack and change inputs, to figure out how to mitigate 
those problems. In other words, you could actually start to model solutions to real-world 
issues, but inside a computer. For me, this whole idea of society as a game was super epic. I 
was obsessed with the idea of the institute that Kogan [a data scientist running a company 
that partnered with CA] suggested to me, and became extremely eager to somehow make it 
happen. And it wasn’t just our pet obsession; professors all over were getting just as enthused. 
After meetings at Harvard, Kogan emailed me about their feedback, saying, “The operative 
term is game changing and revolutionizing social science.” (Wylie, 2019: 103-104). 
 
The ambition was to create a replica of a real society in its entirety, with all its members cloned as virtual 
agents in a computer simulation. The computer simulation however would not stop its work in the virtual 
realm: as an intervention tool in the real world, the results, once optimised in the virtual domain, would then 
be replicated in the real world (Wylie 2019: 92). The background to this interest in simulating societies is the 
growing academic niche of social simulation (Diallo et al., 2019; Sun, 2006), which is gaining increasing 
attention from policy-makers who are interested in modelling specific policy outcomes to drive their decisions 
(Lawton, 2019; Sun, 2018). However, these academic studies are carried out on ethically cleared available 
datasets and do not usually have a component of real time intervention in the real world, as this is quite rightly 
considered problematic in terms of established ethical standards in academic research.2 
The dystopian dimension of the project emerges most forcefully in a passage of Wylie’s book where Wylie 
and colleagues make an impromptu test of the validity of the fine-grained personal data they had collated from 
tens of millions of Americans: 
 
Jucikas [data scientist employed by CA] made a brief presentation before turning to Bannon. 
“Give me a name.” 
Bannon looked bemused and gave a name. 
“Okay. Now give me a state.” 
“I don’t know,” he said. “Nebraska.” 
 
2 I am grateful to data scientist and social simulation scholar Ivan Puga-Gonzalez for pointing out in a personal communication 








Jucikas typed in a query, and a list of links popped up. He clicked on one of the many people 
who went by that name in Nebraska–and there was everything about her, right up on the 
screen. Here’s her photo, here’s where she works, here’s her house. Here are her kids, this is 
where they go to school, this is the car she drives. She voted for Mitt Romney in 2012, she 
loves Katy Perry, she drives an Audi, she’s a bit basic … and on and on and on. We knew 
everything about her–and for many records, the information was updated in real time, so if 
she posted to Facebook, we could see it happening. 
And not only did we have all her Facebook data, but we were merging it with all the 
commercial and state bureau data we’d bought as well. And imputations made from the U.S. 
Census. We had data about her mortgage applications, we knew how much money she made, 
whether she owned a gun. We had information from her airline mileage programs, so we 
knew how often she flew. We could see if she was married (she wasn’t). We had a sense of 
her physical health. And we had a satellite photo of her house, easily obtained from Google 
Earth. We had re-created her life in our computer. She had no idea. 
“Give me another,” said Jucikas. And he did it again. And again. (Wylie, 2019: 110) 
 
They then decide to test the validity of this information by randomly calling people in their databases, under 
false pretences: 
 
“Do we have their phone numbers?” Nix asked. I told him we did. And then, in one of those 
moments of weird brilliance he occasionally had, he reached for the speakerphone and asked 
for the number. As Jucikas relayed it to him, he punched in the number. 
After a couple of rings, someone picked up. We heard a woman say “Hello?” and Nix, in his 
most posh accent, said, “Hello, ma’am. I’m terribly sorry to bother you, but I’m calling from 
the University of Cambridge. We are conducting a survey. Might I speak with Ms. [Jane 
Doe], please?” The woman confirmed she was [Jane], and Nix started asking her questions 
based on what we knew from her data. 
“Ms. [Doe], I’d like to know, what is your opinion of the television show Game of Thrones?” 
[Jane] raved about it–just as she had on Facebook. “Did you vote for Mitt Romney in the last 
election?” [Jane] confirmed that she had. Nix asked whether her kids went to such-and-such 
elementary school, and [Jane] confirmed that, too. When I looked over at Bannon, he had a 
huge grin on his face. 
After Nix hung up with [Jane], Bannon said, “Let me do one!” We went around the room, all 
of us taking a turn. It was surreal to think that these people were sitting in their kitchen in 
Iowa or Oklahoma or Indiana, talking to a bunch of guys in London who were looking at 
satellite pictures of where they lived, family photos, all of their personal information. (Wylie, 
2019: 111)3 
 
And while Wylie is aware of the disturbing implications of their actions, he does not hide the excitement he 
felt at that moment. This was the test for the vision they had been pursuing all along: 
 
 
3 The original name of the person called by Nix was presumably anonymised in Wylie’s (2019) account, but Wylie never made 








We had done it. We had reconstructed tens of millions of Americans in silico, with potentially 
hundreds of millions more to come. This was an epic moment. I was proud that we had 
created something so powerful. I felt sure it was something that people would be talking 
about for decades. (Wylie, 2019: 111) 
 
The textual references from Wylie’s book reported here are dense with meaning, and let transpire the main 
actors’ excitement about this totalising vision of capturing and remoulding society through computer 
simulations. One immediate reaction that many might have is of outrage and shock at the kind of surveillance 
apparatus allegedly put up by CA, all geared up towards influencing voters without their awareness. It is hard 
not to cringe at the prospect that all this information about us is available out there, and that other rogue 
operations such as CA could be applying similar methods to influence and manipulate our behaviour. But once 
we move beyond the outrage, there are a number of epistemological and ontological questions which 
complicate the picture significantly: 
 
• Q1: Who is that digital double of Jane Doe captured in the CA dashboard? Is this digital double 
a different entity from the analogue Jane Doe? 
• Q2: Is her digital double a replica of her physical self, in the sense that elements of the digital 
double stand in a one-to-one correspondence with equivalent elements of the analogue self? 
• Q3: Does that double behave in the computer models – at least to some extent – as her analogue 
self would behave in a similar real life situation? 
 
In the rest of the article, I will try to provide some answers to these questions, also as a way to explore a 
different angle to assess the potential efficacy of CA data tools. 
 
3. Datafication of the self and the political economy of surveillance capitalism 
 
As experts who have criticised a certain sensationalism in media reports about the CA data scandal have 
already noted (Levine, 2018), multiple versions of our digital doubles are already out there, constantly created 
and remoulded by myriads of algorithms developed by big and small tech companies, from Facebook and 
Google to insurance companies and banks and various state policing and security agencies. The extent to which 
this is the case, and the quality of the data extraction and of the algorithms, vary significantly from company 
to company, from agency to agency, and laws and regulations can do a lot to curb some of the potential abuses 
of big data and algorithms. Wylie (2019) is trying to articulate something that is already happening in our daily 
lives – as long as we are connected to the internet, it is enough to be using a major search engine, even without 
any social media account, and regularly browse news and other websites, to be entangled in this unbounded 
ever expanding ecosystem of personal data extraction. 
This apparatus of data collection, prediction and manipulation of user behaviour is at the centre of the latest 
book written by organisational scholar Shoshana Zuboff (2019), who provides a comprehensive, empirically 
grounded and theoretically astute conceptual framework to understand the latest stage of digital capitalism, 
which she labels “surveillance capitalism”. 
With an impressive range of cases and an in-depth focus on the activities of Facebook and Google and their 
acquisitions, Zuboff (2019) indeed shows that personal data is continuously extracted from our online (and 
increasingly offline) activities, and channelled in a monumental decentralised collective nervous system of 
sorts that constantly transforms our human experience into data. There are no epistemological boundaries for 








that leaves an electronic trace, from our social media usage and internet searches to images, sounds, text and 
other types of data captured by sensors that are in our “smart” homes, shopping malls, public spaces, airports, 
train stations and so on. Even when we are not directly and consciously connected to our devices, such as 
smartphones and laptops, the pervasiveness of these sensors enables all kinds of human and environmental 
data being fed back into this giant unmappable invisible machine. 
Zuboff (2019) cogently notes that this massive infrastructure of data extraction does not stop at extracting 
and rerouting data from our lives: it feeds into a behavioural engineering cycle (Zuboff, 2019: 203) that 
produces predictions about our behaviours and interventions related to these predictions, with the overall aim 
to ensure what she calls “guaranteed outcomes” (Zuboff, 2019: 208-217) – that is, 100% predictive accuracy. 
The implications are far reaching: the goal of surveillance capitalists, according to Zuboff (2019), is to create 
a society where everybody and everything behaves according to the predictions of models and simulations run 
in real time on humans and their environment. It is a society where, for instance, insurance companies can 
adjust premiums instantaneously according to past and present user behaviour, and where software can disable 
a car remotely when drivers default on loan repayments (Zuboff 2019: 212-215). The society envisioned by 
surveillance capitalists is driven by algorithms and by the corporations and data scientists that sit in the control 
room, while the process of “behavioural modification” (2019: 201, 319-327) – with people being steered 
towards or prohibited from performing certain actions – takes place without the awareness of the individuals 
whose lives are datafied (2019: 186). 
 
4. The autonomous life of an avatar 
 
Zuboff claims that this lack of awareness is an essential aspect that enables the system’s reproduction 
(Zuboff 2019: 306-308). 
This part of the argument is key to Zuboff’s view of human agency: surveillance capitalism is at its essence 
a deception, it manipulates people into doing things for purposes other than those they consciously intend to 
pursue. Users become “the means to others’ ends” (Zuboff, 2019: 88) – the ends of surveillance capitalists. 
This fits well with Zuboff’s portrait of behaviourist social engineering under surveillance capitalism – 
explicitly modelled on 1950s dystopian behaviourism (Zuboff, 2019: 361-375) – which conceives human 
agency as a captured, captive agency, devoid of privacy, freedom and ultimately dignity, colonised and 
subjugated by big data and algorithms directly intervening in our offline realities to open or close paths, enable 
or disable action, and so on. 
But the captured human agent in Zuboff’s characterisation remains somewhat authentic and faithful to its 
analogue original – it is an analogue human held captive by a digital system that is experienced as something 
external to the agent, that can constrain and direct their material actions, and confuse their consciousness, but 
cannot ultimately change their analogue constitution. 
This is aligned with Zuboff’s fundamentally “liberal humanist” (Hayles, 1999) view of society: Zuboff does 
not criticise capitalism or technology per se, but just how they have been perverted by a powerful group of 
actors (the big tech companies) and ultimately turned into tools of oppression that diminish and constrain 
people’s individual freedoms (Zuboff, 2019: 14-17, 220-226). Once these actors have been confronted and put 
in check, capitalism and technology can be once again repurposed for the good of society, and for the nurturing 
of human freedoms (Zuboff, 2019: 520-525). In line with thinking in the liberal tradition Zuboff repeatedly 
positions herself in (e.g. Zuboff, 2019: 358-359, 513, 522), the unity of the self implied in her writing is key 
to maintain the ultimate inalienability of the individual freedom to exist. The system can deceive us into doing 








cannot take away from us that inalienable freedom to think and imagine ourselves as free and autonomous 
individuals. 
For Zuboff, the answer to Q1 (Who is that digital double of Jane Doe captured in the CA dashboard? Is this 
digital double a different entity from the analogue Jane Doe?) is simple: there is only one analogue Jane Doe, 
and what CA does is capture her and make her captive, without her awareness. CA is one of the many 
surveillance capitalist firms that extracts data from millions of Jane Does, and its specific purpose is to modify 
their electoral behaviour in order to deliver Trump’s victory in the ballot box. 
For Zuboff, there are no ontologically different digital doubles to speak of. I argue that such unitary view 
of human agency stops short of considering the implications of Zuboff’s own argument. She does not consider 
the insights of social scientific and humanistic studies of human-technology interactions which focus on the 
important role that mediation plays in shaping such relations – see for instance postphenomenological 
approaches by Ihde (1990) and Verbeek (2005), the posthumanist paradigm by Hayles (1999, 2012) and 
activity theory approaches by Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006) – and the deep changes to self and identity that our 
relationships with digital technologies produce (Turkle, 1984, 2011). 
Zuboff does not take stock of the ontological and epistemological implications of the growing body of 
research that focuses on the complex relationships we develop with our digital doubles. From Nusselder’s 
(2009) philosophical account of the influence of fantasy on our relationship with our digital doubles, to Sherry 
Turkle’s (2011) ethnographic narrations of how teenagers curate their digital avatars and enter into conflict 
and tense exchanges with them, and run-of-the-mill experiments that show how virtual reality doubles in 
simulation games influence physical behaviour in the offline world (Laha and Bailenson, 2017), there is 
significant empirical evidence to support the thesis that the mediations at work in the complex interactions the 
analogue Jane Doe has with digital devices produces a digital Jane Doe that has different – albeit in some way 
related – characteristics from the analogue original.4 
But if the digital double of Jane Doe is not the same person as the analogue Jane Doe, what kind of 
relationships holds between the two? 
 
5. The dissolving link between analogue reality and digital representation 
 
To answer Q2 (Is Jane Doe’s digital double a replica of her physical self, in the sense that elements of the 
digital double stand in a one-to-one correspondence with equivalent elements of the analogue self?), we need 
to move away from Zuboff, and revise her theoretical framework in a different direction. I propose what I 
believe to be a strong candidate for this repurposing work, which sits well with the broader context of the 
literature on mediation and digital doubles that I mentioned above: philosopher and activist Guy Debord’s 
(2005 [1967]) theory of the Spectacle, first published in the late 1960s. 
The main reason for choosing Debord vis-à-vis more recent approaches cited before such as 
postphenomenology, posthumanism and activity theory, is that, while these approaches provide important 
critiques and counterpoints to the fiction of the free individual, they tend to offer paradigms of integration 
between humans and machines that still maintain a certain idea of a unified, albeit significantly expanded and 
systemically interconnected human self.5 Debord, on the other hand, provides an interpretation of subjectivity 
 
4 For a recent review of related literature subsumed under the topic of virtual identities, see Dinnen (2020). 
5 There is important recent work in the posthumanist paradigm (Goriunova, 2019; Wark, 2019) that takes seriously the possibility 
of distinct digital subjects that are not easily subsumed under a unitary conception of the self. These works however seem to 








that opens the way for the conceptualisation of two related but ontologically distinct selves emerging from 
evolving material relations of production within capitalism, as I will show in this section.  
Another social theorist that comes to mind when talking about simulations is of course Jean Baudrillard, but 
here too there are reasons for preferring Debord. Baudrillard’s theory of simulation seems to locate the subject 
(or whatever is left of it in his theorisation, if anything at all) firmly and fully in the simulation, with no 
dialectics between an inside and an outside – hence no real movement, struggle or conflict can take place, only 
endless repetition regulated by “the structural law of value” (Baudrillard, 2017 [1976]: 71). Baudrillard sees 
the totalising reality of simulation as one where all kinds of mirroring, doubles and reflections are gone, and 
where “the real is no longer reflected, but folds in on itself to the point of exhaustion” (Baudrillard, 2017: 93). 
This makes Baudrillard’s theory less dynamic than Debord’s, and more useful to hint at what might happen if 
simulation becomes a total reality with nothing else outside it – which is something that I will touch upon 
towards the end of this article, but I consider at this stage more a potential of the current stage of digital 
capitalism, than a widespread reality. In addition, Baudrillard’s scathing rejection of Marxism and of the 
production paradigm, and his resolute call for the end of political economy (e.g. Baudrillard, 1975 [1973], 
2017) make his work less suitable for a productive integration and comparison with Zuboff’s (2019) political 
economy analysis.6 
Debord’s (2005) provocative theoretical pamphlet The Society of the Spectacle continues to inspire many 
thinkers of contemporary society. While it is far from mainstream in social theory, academic debates and 
contributions are constantly produced (see for instance Briziarelli and Armano, 2017; Bunyard, 2018; Kellner, 
2003; McDonough, 2002). Debord’s theory was developed with the screens of TV and cinema in mind, rather 
than those of laptops and smartphones, but a niche of scholars who continue to be inspired by Debord’s work 
have revised his theories, showing their relevance to the era of the internet and social media. Best and Kellner 
(1999) have revised the notion of the Spectacle into the “interactive spectacle”, updating Debord to the early 
years of the internet, while Briziarelli and Armano (2017) have developed the notion of the Spectacle 2.0 – 
they also use the word “digital spectacle” for the same concept, which is what I borrow from them in this 
section. 
While Debord’s own work and that of older and more recent followers assign a crucial role to the 
subjectivities before, within and outside the Spectacle, fine-grained ontological and epistemological 
discussions of the subjective aspects of Spectacle are often confined to geographic concerns (e.g. Szaniecki, 
2017). These accounts are inspired by the urban techniques of Debord and his colleagues of the Situationist 
International developed, where walking around and reflecting about the experience, and deconstructing 
Cartesian cartographies of production and consumption, were used as subversive tactics to decentre capitalist 
hegemony (Bassett, 2004). What I offer here is not a wholly original interpretation of Debord, but one that 
tries to translate aspects of his work into a more explicit way than most scholars using Debord usually do, with 
a specific focus on the ontological status of subjectivities in and outside the Digital Spectacle, which is often 
 
surveillance capitalists, and thus provide little in the form of the social and political critique needed to reflect on the advance of 
technology giants in all spheres of contemporary life. 
6 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a systematic comparison of the similarities and differences between Debord’s 
theory of the Spectacle, and Baudrillard’s work on simulacra and simulation (see also Best and Kellner, n.d.; Shapiro, 2018). It 
should be noted though that Baudrillard was influenced by the ideas of Debord and other members of the Situationist 
International that Debord was part of (Best and Kellner, n.d.). One major difference between the two is that Debord’s work is 
grounded in a political engagement that aims at resisting the growing spectacularisation of reality, while one struggles to find a 








underexplored, or left implicit, in much of this literature. My treatment provides a bridge between the literature 
on digital subjectivities more broadly on one hand, and Debord’s ideas on the other. 
The key idea behind Debord’s work can be summarised as follows: at the time of Debord’s writing, the 
system of production, consumption and exchange had moved to a new stage, where the main commodities 
were images (broadly defined) and immaterial things (such as images embodying certain identities, aspirations, 
values and so on), and the material world of production was now driven by this ever expanding market of 
images. A direct effect of this was that relationships between humans were primarily mediated by images (the 
Spectacle in its various manifestations; Debord, 2005: 7), rather than physical relations of production. These 
mediated relations were expanding in all spheres of life, irreversibly replacing previously unmediated 
relationships (Debord, 2005: 7).  
Building on Marxist theories of alienation, Debord ties together this evolution of production of images with 
workers’ alienation from their own authentic selves and relations, via the exploitative system of image 
production, consumption and exchange. It is not just workers’ physical labour that was alienated from workers, 
but also other aspects of their unmediated life, which were replaced by mediated life. Identities, desires and 
aspirations were bought and sold through spectacularised commodities (e.g. TV programmes or music 
expressing some of these commodified immaterial elements): workers provided their physical and emotional 
labour in the service of the Spectacle, to then buy the spectacularised decayed version of the authentic relations 
that they had lost in the process (Debord, 2005: 15, 21-22).  
Debord sets spectacular reality almost as a kind of virus that gradually eats up the “unity” of directly 
experienced reality. He sees the move from physical commodities to spectacular commodities as a fundamental 
change in human experience, where direct experience of reality is negated and what he somewhat cryptically 
terms “the unity of life” is gone. Resonant with parallel developments in postmodern theory (e.g. Baudrillard, 
1994, 2017), the Spectacle is characterised by the autonomisation of representation (Debord, 2005: 11). The 
implication is that the link between representation and objective reality is broken, so that representation 
becomes a world unto itself, and the Spectacle becomes a self-referential system of production: its only evident, 
dominant goal is to reproduce itself. Inspired by Lukács’ (1971) notion of reification (an influential 
reinterpretation and expansion of Marx’s original formulation of commodity fetishism), Debord shows that 
once capital is “accumulated to the point that it becomes images” (Debord, 2005: 17), the fetishisation of 
commodities enters a new, ontologically different stage, where images are no more mere illusions that deflect 
from material relations of production (e.g. the exploitation of labour by ruling classes mystified through 
religion; Debord, 2005: 13-14), but become the protagonists of the system of production: images are produced 
and consumed (Debord, 2005: 14-15), they totalise reality, and replace directly experienced reality with 
spectacular reality. Anything material that is left in this system is subsumed under the imperative of the 
production and consumption of images. 
Debord also makes it clear that spectacular reality and directly experienced reality are not structurally 
analogous or comparable:  
 
The spectacle cannot be abstractly contrasted to concrete social activity. Each side of such a 
duality is itself divided. The spectacle that falsifies reality is nevertheless a real product of 
that reality. Conversely, real life is materially invaded by the contemplation of the spectacle, 
and ends up absorbing it and aligning itself with it. Objective reality is present on both sides. 
Each of these seemingly fixed concepts has no other basis than its transformation into its 
opposite: reality emerges within the spectacle, and the spectacle is real. This reciprocal 









This extract is particularly telling. Its dense multitude of concepts and linkages is characteristic of Debord’s 
style, often making his work more of a prophetic oracular set of statements, than a clearly developed argument. 
But unpacking some of these aphorisms can help us understand some of the aspects of the CA project of 
(re)creating “society in silico”. Here we have the two realities (spectacular and directly experienced) 
dialectically opposed to each other, and distinguished by ontologically different constitutions. There is also a 
more fluid process of penetration and replacement, whereas directly experienced reality is “materially invaded” 
by spectacular reality, until eventually the latter replaces the former: 
 
The images detached from every aspect of life merge into a common stream in which the 
unity of that life can no longer be recovered. Fragmented views of reality regroup themselves 
into a new unity as a separate pseudo-world that can only be looked at. The specialization of 
images of the world evolves into a world of autonomised images where even the deceivers 
are deceived. The spectacle is a concrete inversion of life, an autonomous movement of the 
nonliving. (Debord, 2005: 7) 
 
The important insight to bear in mind here is the ontological difference – and thus the difference in human 
experience and sociality – that Debord posits between these two analytically distinct, but effectively 
interpenetrating, realities: on one hand direct experience, the unity of life, and on the other hand separation, 
alienation and abstraction. The Spectacle is the culmination of that process of workers’ alienation from their 
own labour, the ultimate alienation, where all that workers produce become images which they then consume 
under the illusory guise of “leisure time” (Debord, 2005: 89). 
It is also important to remember that Debord’s focus on “directly experienced reality” is not rooted in a 
transcendental concept of authenticity, but in Marxist theories of action and production. Debord refers to 
“concrete social activity” (2005: 8, 14) as such basis. The Spectacle is rooted in a theory of the commodity. 
According to Debord, “[t]he spectacle is the stage at which the commodity has succeeded in totally colonizing 
social life” (Debord, 2005: 21). Once the “quantitative development” of the commodity leads to an endless 
“abundance” (Debord, 2005: 19-20), and to the constant need for the system to reproduce itself, thus emerges 
the Spectacle as the culmination of this stage of total commodification of social life. It is at this point that 
various dialectical inversions occur. Once use value is totally subsumed under exchange value, it becomes 
“pseudo-use” value (Debord, 2005: 23-24). Once all workers’ labour is commodified, a “new poverty” 
(Debord, 2005: 23) emerges, and survival becomes “augmented survival” (Debord, 2005: 23, 87). “Primary 
human needs” are replaced by “pseudoneeds”: 
 
Replacing [economic] necessity with a necessity for boundless economic development can 
only mean replacing the satisfaction of primary human needs (now scarcely met) with an 
incessant fabrication of pseudoneeds, all of which ultimately come down to the single 
pseudoneed of maintaining the reign of the autonomous economy. (Debord, 2005: 24) 
 
The Marxist economic foundations of the Spectacle are key to understand what the Spectacle is and how it 
operates. Debord is trying to show the Spectacle as a “total social fact” in the Maussian sense, to reveal its 
totalising nature, its systemic properties, as a way to pierce through the illusions and deceptions the Spectacle 
creates. The principle of replacement of directly experienced reality with spectacular reality is then rooted in 
a political economic process of commodification of all aspects of social life, coupled with automation and the 








reality gradually replacing the unity of life under pre-spectacular production. Here technology needs to be 
understood as indissolubly entangled with the production system. 
If we revise and extend Debord’s insight and apply it to CA vision of a “society in silico” and to Zuboff’s 
treatment of surveillance capitalism, we can come up with comprehensive framework that begins to explain 
how digital reality (in Debord’s terms, spectacular reality) is increasingly colonising and replacing analogue 
reality (in Debord’s terms, directly experienced reality) – or in terms of this article’s analytical language, how 
digital humanity is replacing analogue humanity. What Debord might be describing is the autonomous life of 
Jane Doe’s digital double and how such life follows its own rules and processes that are distinct, albeit in 
constant interaction with, the analogue self. 
 
6. The Digital Spectacle and social media 
 
To come back to Q2, from the treatment of Debord in the previous section, it becomes clear that there is no 
one-to-one correspondence between the digital double of Jane Doe and her analogue self. Rather the two 
interact in dialectical relations, both are real in their own terms, and embedded in their own wider social and 
economic fabrics, yet with the digital double operating as a Spectacle of the analogue self – in this sense, a 
more abstract working definition of Digital Spectacle is “the inversion of the analogue reality the Digital 
Spectacle purportedly refers to”. Strictly speaking, not all references between the two selves are severed, but 
the replacement of the analogue self with the digital double operates through a deception: it gives the illusion 
that the digital double is in fact just a replica of the analogue self, but in practice the digital double insidiously 
replaces the analogue self, in a process of conquest and cannibalisation of sorts. 
If we think about the world of social media, we end up with: Facebook friends, rather than real friends; 
digital democracy, rather than real participation; online communities rather than really lived community life; 
and so on. The semblance of analogue reality that spectacular reality portrays and performs is key in the process 
of replacement: after all, tech companies and techno-enthusiasts are allegedly just asking us to do the same 
thing, but better and “smarter”. Rather than revealing its surveillance capitalist machinery geared towards 
advertising revenues, Facebook tells us that it is just about keeping in touch with old friends and classmates, 
or communicating one’s message for a better world to a wider audience. 
This “same, same, but different” principle is a crucial communicative tactic to lure analogue selves in digital 
life, until it is often too late to reverse the trend: most of our social contacts might now be on Facebook, and 
we struggle to keep physical contact with old friends in the real world, as was the norm before the rise of the 
Digital Spectacle. 
The process of online curation is one example of how our digital doubles take up a life of their own, all the 
while we might still be deceived that they are nothing more than extensions, replicas or mirrors of our analogue 
selves (see also Turkle, 2011). First, the fact that we effectively “curate” and “edit” this digital version of 
ourselves already shows a certain separation, a distance between our analogue self and our digital creation. 
Secondly, the digital double develops its own autonomous relations with other digital doubles that are not 
entirely or even primarily under our control: think for instance when some of our social media posts or videos 
go viral, producing all kinds of emotional reactions and interpretations online well beyond what we could 
predict and control at the time of producing that content. Other people interact with our digital doubles in ways 
that are primarily determined by the mediated interactions in the digital world, projecting their own meanings, 
fantasies and desires onto our digital doubles in ways that establish specific relations to the curated content 
(often further edited and curated by others, and not just our analogue selves) that are quite different from what 
such interactions would have been in physical life without the mediation of the digital. But even the idea that 








more time online, more aspects of our offline life are digitised, and we start thinking and adapting to the rules, 
interactions and relationships that our digital doubles have with the rest of the world, with our offline behaviour 
increasingly shaped and dependent on our online communications. 
Let me provide a telling illustration that gives a glimpse of the uncanny dialectical relationship that can 
develop between these two selves.7 A researcher leaves Facebook several months earlier, also driven by her 
increasing scepticism about the usefulness of the platform and by her concerns about the negative atmosphere 
of this online environment. A video is then produced by her institution, profiling her work with a personal 
interview – the interview is curated by the media office of the institution, emphasising through its editing and 
montage the passion and commitment of the researcher to social justice. A colleague who knows the researcher 
personally shares the video in their Facebook feed, and the video impacts several others to the point of spurring 
rather personal reactions. Other academics, many of whom do not have a close relationship to the researcher 
in the video, start to convivially saying hello on the colleague’s wall, calling the researcher by her first name, 
greeting her and sending other positive feedback directly addressed to her in a personal manner, as if they were 
engaged in a friendly talk with the researcher herself. All of this happened beyond the control of the analogue 
self of the researcher. When I brought it to her attention, the reaction was mostly one of puzzlement and 
discomfort. The researcher expressed surprise but also an uncanny feeling, as she could not recognise herself 
in that interaction – it was her, in some way, but it was also not. This example puts into stark relief some of 
the aspects of the relationship between our analogue selves and their digital doubles, but we tend to engage in 
most of these activities without a conscious awareness of how deeply entangled with, but also alienated from 
our digital doubles we are, as we increase the time we spend online and the range of activities we carry out 
with digital tools.8 
 
7. Reality tricks 
 
To move back from the nitty-gritty details of digital agency to the bigger structures at work, what Zuboff’s 
work does, if repurposed next to Debord’s groundbreaking ideas about subjectivity, is to provide a clear and 
empirically sound account of the agency of those who benefit from the replacement of analogue selves with 
digital doubles: the surveillance capitalists. This puts a face on the often faceless and structural analysis of 
Debord and Debordian scholarship. 
If we apply the insights derived from Debord to the “society in silico” experiment by CA key players, it 
becomes clearer why that simulation of society in the CA dashboard is qualitatively different from the analogue 
reality it refers to. Yet, the ideological trick is that CA employees sell it as what it is not: a working replica of 
the original. This deception too is based on making the targets unaware of the real story: potential clients need 
to believe that CA is indeed an operation based on objective facts and methods, and that they are really onto 
something “scientifically proven” and thus effective. If clients were told that simulations had their own 
autonomous (and often mysterious) life, and did not actually adhere to the reality “out there”, then it would be 
rather hard to buy them in. I am not here suggesting that all CA employees were themselves aware of this 
deception: it is quite possible, even likely, that Wylie and his data scientist colleagues believed that they were 
 
7 I use this anonymised example with permission from the person involved. 
8 Some readers will probably recognise the influence of psychoanalytical theories of the self in these illustrations. One inspiration 
here is psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s influential concept of the “mirror stage” (Lacan, 1977; Thibierge and Morin, 2010). A 
more in-depth treatment of this line of inquiry is however beyond the scope of this article. For an integration of Debord’s insights 








working on a true replica in line with hard to die positivist tenets. If so, this would make the “reality” trick all 
the more believable. 
Setting aside their own awareness and interpretation of the experiment, what were Wylie and colleagues 
testing when they randomly called some of the digital doubles in their system? Was the success of that test not 
the proof that there was in fact a correspondence between the digital double of Jane Doe and her analogue self? 
Did the “real” Jane Doe not answer correctly all the questions posed to her, confirming the validity of the 
simulated data? Surely the simulation must have captured something real then? 
I am not pushing my analysis to the point of saying that there is no Jane Doe out there that is not already an 
extension of her digital double. While a process of digital conquest might be under way, there is no proof yet 
that it will be complete any time soon, or that it will ever be.  
But the CA phone test itself has no external object to compare to, it has no external reality that validates the 
simulated data. Wylie and colleagues are acting and talking from within the simulation, and they ask questions 
that merely confirm the validity of specific digital data points they held about the person they speak to: all 
confirmation comes from within the simulation. This situation is resonant with Baudrillard’s ideas about 
simulation, where all referents to external reality are gone, and the reign of “operational simulation” means 
that reality is driven by a continuous series of tests, polls and stimulus-response mechanisms that elicit  from 
the subjects participating in the simulation a range of options and answers that were already inscribed in the 
“generative models” that underpinned the system (Baudrillard, 2017: 78-89). 
  CA staff knew that Jane Doe loves Game of Thrones, but how much did they know about why she loved 
the series, and what kind of reactions it provoked in her, even beyond what she could articulate on Facebook? 
They knew some basic demographics about the family, but did they know the kind of relationship Jane Doe 
had with their children in her everyday life outside the screen of her smartphone? 
The Jane Doe that speaks on the phone, to the extent that she is led by her digital data points (and as in 
Zuboff’s treatment, without her awareness of what is going on), is in fact a physical extension of her digital 
double. Insofar as her life might be already heavily mediated by the online world, Jane on the phone is indeed 
an extension of the simulation, an agent responding to certain stimuli and moving in a maze of rewards and 
punishments heavily steered by her social media feed – now I am talking hypothetically, as we do not really 
know about the life of that specific person mentioned by Wylie (2019) beyond what is recounted in his book. 
This highlights another important implication of this analysis: the separation between analogue selves and 
digital doubles is not synonymous with that between physical and online. Abstract phenomena such as thoughts 
can be analogue (that is, if they are delinked in content, structure and mode from the digital world), just as our 
physical actions can be directed and influenced by our digital doubles. The power of the simulation is then 
assessed as the power to influence real life behaviour, both online and offline. As Zuboff (2019) cogently 
notes, surveillance capitalism is moving from a stage where the main goal has been to get people online via 
multiple screen-equipped devices (e.g. a laptop or a smartphone), to one where the rendering of human 
experience into data happens ubiquitously, even more insidiously in the background, as physical life itself is 
datafied in the material world outside the screen (e.g. sensors collecting data from smart machines or cameras 
recording street life as we go about the physical business of life). The term “offline” itself already indicates a 
significant shift in the relationship between analogue and digital life, as all life is now defined in relation to 
“online” as the default set up.  
 
8. Conclusion: countering the dystopian vision of guaranteed outcomes 
 
Through a sympathetic critique and revision of Zuboff’s theory of surveillance capitalism, I argued that the 








they relate to (Q1). In the 2016 US presidential contest, CA acted as a surveillance capitalist with the aim of 
modifying people’s electoral behaviour in favour of CA client Donald Trump. In the process of datafying US 
analogue voters, CA might have produced digital doubles that entered into a dialectical relationship with their 
analogue selves, through a process that advances the digital conquest of analogue humanity, whereby the 
digital doubles are intended to gradually “swallow up” their analogue selves. 
I will now briefly show that this process of digital conquest is integral to the success of the predictive models 
used by CA and other surveillance capitalists. This leads us to Q3: Does Jane Doe’s digital double behave in 
the computer models – at least to some extent – as her analogue self would behave in a similar real life 
situation? 
This question is really about the predictive quality of CA data tools. Zuboff (2019) makes an important point 
when she stresses that the issue with surveillance capitalism is not just the wholesale granular extraction of 
data. The crux of the matter is that this process of extraction is geared towards behavioural modification aimed 
at “total certainty” (Zuboff, 2019: 382). A predictive model is as good as the validity of its predictions, and 
surveillance capitalists are not just trading in data, but in what Zuboff calls the “guaranteed outcomes” that the 
data is expected to deliver. The relentless expansion of rendering of people’s experience into data that Zuboff 
describes is geared to that purpose: to create a behavioural maze where everything in physical and virtual 
reality is datafied and controlled so that all predictions can, at least in principle, be 100% accurate. 
To rephrase it in terms of my own analysis, Zuboff is describing a process where Wylie’s “society in silico” 
becomes the only “real” society left, and where Jane Does are living as fully digital selves, in their virtual and 
physical forms. It is not materiality itself that disappears here, but rather all materiality becomes datafied – in 
this sense, what we have called analogue humanity, is an essentially dis-connected, de-linked, un-datafied 
reality. 
Here it should also become clear why the increasing replacement of analogue selves with digital doubles – 
the dialectic of which I have explained in Debordian terms – is key for the system’s reach and efficacy, and 
thus the validity of predictions. CA predictive models are only as good as the extent to which their digital 
doubles have effectively replaced the analogue selves they are linked to. This is a spectrum, rather than an 
either/or binary process: the more advanced and pervasive such digital replacement of analogue humanity, the 
closer the adherence of the real life behaviour of Jane Doe and other voters to the behaviour of the digital 
doubles in the CA simulation. This might be the essence of the dystopian society of guaranteed outcomes 
actively imagined and pursued by surveillance capitalists.  
As I have shown before, while Zuboff’s account has made an outstanding and much needed contribution in 
describing the workings of this real life gigantic laboratory experiment, her theory of agency is limited and 
does not make up for the key role played by mediation and the production of digital doubles at the human-
technology interface. The dialectic of duality and conquest that Debord envisaged – which I have here extended 
to the relationship between analogue selves and digital doubles – addresses the limitations of Zuboff’s 
framework, and thus provides a major interpretive key to understand the ontological and epistemological vision 
of CA, as a surveillance capitalist firm intent on (re)creating “society in silico”. 
I conclude by highlighting some key implications of my analysis. This work shows the need to shift the 
emphasis from the technical aspects of algorithmic prediction to the epistemological and ontological aspects 
of a world geared towards total certainty and 100% predictive validity – we need to understand the vision that 
surveillance capitalists are pursuing, if we want to better understand their tools of datafication and algorithmic 
prediction. In the case of CA, the assessment of its alleged efficacy in delivering Trump’s victory takes a 
qualitative philosophical turn that moves beyond previous analyses. 
The word “vision” here is crucial. We need to be careful not to fall into the kind of dystopian thinking that 








aspiration, not a fully realised actuality. It is a dangerous project that we should counter with all our analytical 
power, especially at a time of unprecedented acceleration in digitalisation.9 
A final thought about our fictitious agent, Jane Doe: we can only hope that CA did not develop models good 
enough to significantly transform her directly experienced self into a digital double to be manipulated and 
moulded in the shape of the 2016 Trump campaign messages – although evidence seems to suggest that it is 
entirely possible that enough digital Jane Does were thus created to swing the election in Trump’s favour 
(Laterza, 2021). 
Either way, we are still at the beginning of a much needed academic project to develop the theoretical tools 
and the empirical vocabulary to describe what they are doing to “us” – that analogue “we” that we need to 
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